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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFIC INDEMNITY CO., 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
JERRY G. BRERETON, FIRST 
SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N.A., 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK AND 
BONNEVILLE BANK, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT PACIFIC INDEMNITY COMPANY 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
HONORABLE LEONARD H. RUSSON 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Whether appellant failed to establish jurisdiction in 
this Court because no notice of appeal was filed within the 
time required by Rule 4(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court? 
II. Whether this Court will assume the correctness of the 
lower court's judgment where, as here, appellant fails to cite 
the record to support its contentions on appeal? 
Case No. 870334 
Priority No. 14(b) 
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III. Whether appellant's argument improperly raises and 
addresses defenses under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-419(3) and a 
defense of contributory negligence for the first time on appeal? 
IV. Whether appellant is nevertheless ultimately liable as 
a matter of law, based upon either statutory liability result-
ing from warranty of title or upon collection ratification 
liability? 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-207 (1953, as amended) 
Rule 4(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
Rule 24(a)(6), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
Rule 33(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted respondent Pacific Indemnity 
Company's Motion for Summary Judgment for the reason that 
appellant Bonneville Bank's ("Bonneville") collection of check 
proceeds paid over forged indorsements from payor banks "did 
not constitute a ratification of appellant's delivery to the 
wrong person, [and] that Bonneville retained the check proceeds 
collected from payor banks in trust for [Pacific Indemnity] and 
[Pacific Indemnity] had a right to judgments on those funds." 
(Record at 288.) 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
Respondent Pacific Indemnity Company ("Pacific Indemnity") 
commenced the present action against all named defendants for 
recovery of losses resulting from an embezzlement scheme by 
which defendant Brereton, a salesman for California-based Triad 
Systems Corporation, endorsed and deposited into a personal 
checking account ten customer checks totalling $66,000.00 which 
were intended for his employer. Each of the converted checks 
was deposited in an account at appellant Bonneville Bank under 
the name "Jerry Brereton dba Triad Systems." (Record at 2-8; 
152-153: [Affidavit of Jerry G. Brereton ("Brereton Affidavit") 
at 1f1f 3-5 and attached exhibits].) 
Brereton was able temporarily to mask his scheme through 
payment of $30,000.00 to his employer. His intentions to repay 
the full sum before discovery were not realized, however, and 
at the time his employer uncovered the scheme, there remained 
an unrecovered loss of $36,000.00, which was ultimately paid by 
Pacific Indemnity under employee fidelity coverage. (Record at 
2-8, 151-70; [Brereton Affidavit at 1[ 6].) 
Pacific Indemnity brought this action as subrogee to Triad's 
rights as the rightful owner of the converted instruments. The 
lower court granted Pacific Indemnity's Motion for Summary 
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Judgment against Bonneville Bank based on the ultimate liability 
of appellant Bonneville Bank as the collecting bank. (Record 
at 283-293.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Between approximately December 5, 1980, and June 16, 
1981, Jerry Brereton forged indorsement to at least ten 
customer checks intended for Triad Systems Corporation and 
.deposited those checks into his personal account at Bonneville 
in Provo, Utah, under the name of "Jerry Brereton dba Triad 
Systems," account no. 11-005139-9. (Record at 152: [Brereton 
Affidavit at 1f1f 3-5 and Exhibits thereto].) 
2. Of the checks involved, four were drawn upon and paid 
to Bonneville by First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. ("First 
Security") in amounts totalling $44,000.00. (Record at 126-34, 
152-70: [Brereton Affidavit at 1f 4 and Exhibits B-l, B-2, B-4 
and B-8 attached thereto]; and [Affidavit of Joe F. Deniro at 
inr 8, 12, 16 and 20] . ) 
3. The remaining six checks were drawn upon and paid to 
Bonneville by Zions First National Bank ("Zions") in amounts 
totalling $22,000.00 (Record at 152-70: [Brereton Affidavit at 
1f1f 4 and 5 and Exhibits B-3, B-5, B-6, B-7, B-9 and B-10 
attached thereto].) 
4. The initial endorsement on all checks was made by 
Jerry Brereton, who stamped "For deposit only Triad Systems 
-4-
11-005139-9" on the reverse side of each check before deposit-
ing it in his account at Bonneville (Record 153: [Brereton 
Affidavit at 1f 5] . ) 
5. Mr. Brereton had no authority from his employer to 
deposit or otherwise negotiate customer checks. (Record at 
158-60: [Brereton Affidavit at Exhibit "A-2H].) 
6. On or about May 4 or 5, 1981, Mr. Brereton purchased 
and sent to Triad Systems Corporation a cashier's check in the 
amount of $20,000.00 purchased in the name of customer Five 
Star Motor Supply and a separate cashier's check in the amount 
of $10,000.00 purchased in the name of customer Number One 
Performance. (Record at 158-60: [Brereton Affidavit at Exhibit 
"A-2"].) 
7. Triad Systems Corporation had no knowledge that 
Mr. Brereton maintained a personal account under the name of 
Triad Systems until approximately June, 1981. (Record at 
158-60: [Brereton Affidavit at Exhibit "h-2"].) 
8. Triad Systems Corporation recovered the net embezzle-
ment loss caused by Mr. Brereton by collecting the same under 
employee fidelity insurance coverage furnished by Pacific 
Indemnity Company (Record at 153-54: [Brereton Affidavit at 
1f 6].) 
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9. By subsequent payments directly to Triad Systems 
Corporation, Mr. Brereton reduced the original debt to 
$26,038.07. (Record at 154: [Brereton Affidavit at 1f 8].) 
10. By motion for summary judgment dated April 8, 1987, 
plaintiff sought recovery of the remaining loss from defendants 
First Security and Zions, as drawee banks on the converted 
checks. (Record at 171-82.) 
11. First Security and Zions in turn successfully moved on 
cross-claims against Bonneville for breach of express and 
statutory warranties as the depositary and collecting bank on 
Brereton*s account. (Record at 241-42.) 
12. Pacific Indemnity's Motion for Summary Judgment 
against Bonneville was granted based on the ultimate liability 
of a collecting bank for collection of monies paid over a 
forged endorsement. (Record at 241-43.) 
13. Final judgment as to all the parties was entered on 
June 24, 1987 by Judge Leonard H. Russon of the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County. (Record at 
241-243.) See also Addendum "A." 
14. On June 16, 1987, appellant Bonneville Bank filed a 
Motion for New Hearing (Record at 244-45) and later, on July 6, 
1987, filed a motion to amend its Answer to plead contributory 
negligence against plaintiff. (Record at 274-75, 329-31.) 
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Appelli .•'—•:..- .-> denied by Orders dated August 7th and 
17th, 1987 Record : ^.83 -.•..> See also A>i;:e:; i.\~ ""-l." 
15. Bonneville also filed a tardy Motion * , Amend Judgment 
on August . ^e^; . - • ?f ;.-- he motion was denied 
by Court Order dated September l/, i'iH/ iRecuiii ,it r^ i io.) 
See Addendum "C." 
16. Appellant Bonneville bank t'le^ i i.o notice of appeal 
from the lower court's Judgment until September '*, I 
than seventy days after entry of final judgment. (Record at 
326.), See Addendum "D." 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The focus of Pacific Indemnity's response to Bonneville's 
attempted appeal is upon the multiple and significant proce-
dural defects which independently justify affirmance of the 
summary judgment in favor of Pacific Indemnity as a matter of 
law. 
Bonneville has not established jurisdiction in this court 
because of its failure to timely file required notice of 
appeal. Although the time for filing a notice of appeal may be 
tolled under Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure through 
timely filing of (1) a motion for new trial; or (2) a motion to 
amend judgment, neither exception is applicable in the instant 
appeal. Neither a notice for new trial nor a timely motion to 
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amend judgment was filed by Bonneville. Hence Bonneville's 
time for filing a notice of appeal elapsed on July 24, 1987, 
more than forty days before Bonneville filed its tardy notice. 
Likewise, Bonneville's Motion for Rehearing could not toll the 
time for filing a notice of appeal because no such motion 
exists under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This Court should also assume the correctness of the 
judgment below because Bonneville does not support any of its 
contentions on appeal with citations to the record. Further-
more, Bonneville's contentions on appeal were not raised in the 
lower court until after entry of final judgment and thus should 
not be considered by this court. 
Finally, Bonneville has not raised any dispute as to any 
material fact, except to the extent that it made an untimely 
motion to amend its answer 12 days after entry of final judg-
ment, which motion was denied. Therefore, Pacific Indemnity 
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Bonneville 
is ultimately liable for checks paid over Jerry Brereton's 
forged endorsement either indirectly based on breach of war-
ranty of good title under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-207 (1953, as 
amended), or directly based on a collection liability theory. 
Cooper v. Union Bank, 507 P.2d 609 (Cal. 1973). There being no 
error below, the judgment should be affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BONNEVILLE FAILED TO ESTABLISH JURISDICTION 
IN THIS COURT. 
There is no question that appellate jurisdiction arises 
only it -'- ' appeal is filed within the time prescribed 
by Rule 4(a), Rules of the Utah Supn^me >:,nutt: 
In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a 
matter of right from the district court to the Supreme 
Court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall 
be filed with the clerk of the district court within 
30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or 
order appealed from . . . . 
In Barber v. Emporium Partnership, ih Utah ndv, f np 'i * 
(Utah App. 1988) and Albretson v. Judd, 709 P.2d 347, 348 (Utah 
1985), both of Utah's appellate courts confirmed that failure 
to give notice of appeal within the time prescribed by law 
leaves the appellate courts without jurisdiction. 
Similarly, in Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 657 P.2d 
1346 (Utah 1983), this Court stated, 
The trial court therefore properly denied the motion 
for a "rehearing." Furthermore, the time within which 
defendant could have taken an appeal from the judgment 
was not tolled. . . . The purpose of Rule 73 is to 
make jurisdictional a failure to file a notice of 
appeal on time. The merits of the judgment therefore 
cannot be addressed on this appeal. (Citations 
omitted.) 
Armstrong, *. . . . See also Lord v. Lord, 709 P.2d 
338 (Utah 1985). 
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A. Bonneville Failed To Timely File A Notice Of Appeal, 
Leaving This Court Without Jurisdiction To Consider 
The Lower Court's Summary Judgment. 
In the instant case, Bonneville's docketing statement 
(itself untimely) clearly shows that the final amended judgment 
from which appellant now appeals was entered on June 24, 1987. 
Appellant was required to file its notice of appeal within 
thirty (30) days of that date or by July 24, 1987. Appellant 
failed to file its notice of appeal until September 9, 1987, 77 
days after the date of entry of final judgment. (Record at 
326.) 
This Court has consistently dismissed appeals when a notice 
of appeal has not been timely filed. Since the Court similarly 
lacks appellate jurisdiction in this case, a dismissal of 
Bonneville's appeal is clearly appropriate. 
B. The Time For Filing Appellant's Notice Of Appeal Was 
Not Extended For Any Reason. 
Under appropriate circumstances, the time limit for filing 
a notice of appeal may be tolled. For example, under Rule 59, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a timely motion to amend the 
judgment may toll the 30 day notice of appeal requirement. 
However, Rule 59(e) specifically provides a mandatory 10 day 
limit on filing such a motion to amend. Accordingly, the fact 
that Bonneville did not file any appropriate motion within 
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times prescribed by law clearly demonstrates that the time for 
filing a notice of appeal ran without interruption from June 
24, 198 7 to July 24 1 984 
Thus, the time limits for filing o..:i:;:- . - c 
appeal were not extended by any recognized post judgment 
motions. Although Bonnevilln u<i LIje a "Motion for New 
Hearing" after the trial court's ruling, granting Pacific 
Indemn:* . M-•-; tor Summary Judgment, that motion was 
denied, and Judge Russon observed =\\ * ha+~ Mine,, consistent with 
this Court's holdings, that no motion for "reconsideration" or 
"rehear « <-.-..;• 4-r the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
that such motions are improper .M- : . ) 
In prury v. Lunceford, 13 it an ; i "* ; i t ~- 2d 662 (1966), 
the plaintiff attempted to f:. > > motion for reconsideration in 
order to set aside a judge's order granting a new trial. In 
response, this Court held that: 
If the party ruled against were permitted to go beyond 
the rules, make a motion for [reconsideration], and 
persuade a judge to reverse himself, the question 
arises, why should not the other party who he has now 
ruled against be permitted to make a motion for 
reconsideration, asking the court to again reverse 
himself. 
Id. at 663. This Court stated that under such circumstances "a 
judge could go on reversing himself periodically at the 
entreaties of one or the other of the parties ad infinitum." 
Id. See also Peay v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah 1980). 
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Inherent in this court's condemnation of motions for 
rehearing is the realization that allowing a motion for 
rehearing would create "an unsatisfactory situation . . . if a 
judge could carry in his mind indefinitely a state of 
uncertainty as to what the final resolution of the matter 
should be." Id. Therefore, this court concluded: 
In order to avoid a state of indecision for both the 
judge and the parties, practical expediency demands 
that there be some finality to the actions of the 
court; and he should not be in the position of having 
further duty of acting as a court of review upon his 
own ruling. 
Id. at 663-64. 
This court's ruling in Drury was emphasized in Tracy v. 
University of Utah Hospital, 619 P.2d 340 (Utah 1980). In 
Tracy the plaintiff filed a motion to intervene. Hearing on 
the motion was duly held and it was denied by the trial court 
with prejudice. Thereafter the plaintiff filed another motion 
to intervene and styled it as a motion for "re-hearing." Id. 
at 342. This Court declared that a motion for re-hearing or 
reconsideration "may not be invoked to defeat the time limits 
for appeal of a final order. In any event, our rules of 
procedure make no provision for such a motion. . . . " _Id. at 
342. (Emphasis added.) See also Retherford v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 739 P.2d 76, 80 (Utah App. 1987) (holding 
-12-
that period of Lime in fhi^h appellate jurisdiction must be 
established is unaffected by a motion for reconsideration.) 
In the instant case, the appellant apparently contends that 
it was entitled to a rehearing because (1) as a result of 
"mistake" in assuming the Third Judicial District <_.-,• . r :^t 
Lake County operated under Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice, 
It was inadequately prepare* : .r « n respondent's 
Motion r-r Summary Judgment; and . ^ , oad appellant been a": v-o 
to pt-i •: - *. : .  . . • . opposing affidavit, it may have been 
able to demonstrate a material issue ot inict. Neithp* r,f these 
contentions justifies a rehearing and neither can toll * >- time 
for giving notice of appeal to establish appellate jurisdiction. 
There is no provision in the Rules of Civil Procedure, to 
allow a court to reconsider or rehear a matter because a party 
argues that it might have done something different in light of 
the judgment ultimately entered. Even if such a motion were 
deemed to have been brought under Rule 60(b), it would not have 
tolled the time for appeal. Lord, 709 P.2d at 338, n. 1. 
Appellant Bonneville's additional post judgment motions 
similarly cannot extend the 30 day time limit for filing a 
notice of appeal in violation of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Bonneville's tardy Motion to Amend Answer cannot 
toll the time for filing a notice of appeal, especially where 
the motion was filed after entry of final judgment. Moreover, 
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Bonneville fails to raise any issue as to the propriety of the 
lower court's denial of the Motion to Amend Answer. 
The Motion to Amend Judgment, similarly, was not a timely 
motion for post judgment relief and did not otherwise toll or 
extend the time for filing a notice of appeal from the June 24 
Judgment. Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly 
provides that "a motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be 
served not later than ten days after entry of the judgment." 
(Emphasis added.) In the instant case, appellant did not file 
its Motion to Amend Judgment until August 20, 1987, more than 
50 days after entry of judgment. (Record at 330-31.) Because 
of its untimely filing, appellant's Motion to Amend could not 
alter the mandatory time for filing a notice of appeal, which 
had already elapsed on July 24, 1987. 
Furthermore, appellant's motion was without authority under 
the Rules of Civil Procedure because it impermissibly sought to 
amend only the date of entry of judgment apparently for the 
purpose of extending time to file a notice of appeal. Even if 
such a motion were allowed, appellant's motion falls far outside 
the maximum period of time allowed by Rule 59(e). See Hume v. 
Small Claims Court of Murray City, 590 P.2d 309 (Utah 1979). 
Thus, pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure and this 
Court's decisions, Bonneville's attempts to manufacture an 
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excuse to defeat the i .• : r ime limits set for giving 
notice of appeal from -* t ;iia judgment must be considered 
inappropriate and unavailing. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD ASSUME THE
 C ORRECTNESS OF 
THE JUDGMENT BELOW BECAUSE APPELLANT FAILED 
TO REFER TO ANY PORTION OF THE RECORD THAT 
FACTUALLY SUPPORTS TTS CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL, 
This Court has consistently held that it will assume the 
correctness oil the judgment below, where, as here, an appellant 
does not support facts set forth in his or ,^ .-: * - na-
tions to the Record. Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d f -2. -. : i (Utah 
1987) and State v. Tucker, - >" P ; i 755, 756-57 (Utah 1982). 
In Trees, this Court declared that it: 
will assume the correctness of the judgment below 
where counsel on appeal does not comply with the 
requirements of Rule 75(p)(2)(2)(d), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, as to making a concise statement of 
facts and citation of the pages in the record where 
they are supported. (Citations omitted.)1 
In Trees, the fact statement in the appellant's Brief referred 
to documents by their exhibit numbers, but contained no 
1Rule 24(a)(6), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, which 
became effective in April 1987, ultimately replaced 
former Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 75(p)(2)(2)(d), 
but did not alter the requirement that citations to 
the record to support the fact statement in the 
Briefs. See Trees, 738 P.2d at 613, n.3. 
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citations to the Record. Occasional references to the record 
appeared in the Argument section of the Brief. Trees, 738 P.2d 
at 612, n.2. 
Similarly, in State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756-57 (Utah 
1982), this Court concluded that: 
A separate and independent basis for the affirmance of 
the trial court is that the defendant failed to refer 
to any portion of the record that factually supports 
his contention on appeal. 
In the instant case, and despite references to exhibits and 
affidavits, Bonneville makes no reference whatsoever to the 
Record to support any factual contentions. Accordingly, this 
Court should assume the correctness of the judgment below and 
may affirm that judgment on this independent basis. 
POINT III 
BONNEVILLE'S IMPROPERLY RAISED CONTENTIONS 
AND DEFENSES CANNOT BE CONSIDERED FOR THE 
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
This Court has forcefully and consistently held that it 
will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. 
Sorensen v. Larsen, 740 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1987); Topik v. Thurber, 
739 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Utah 1987); Insley Manufacturing Corp. v. 
Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 (Utah 1986). 
This Court has stated that the record must clearly show 
that an issue was "timely presented to the trial court in a 
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manner sufficient i.u obtain <i ruiing thereon. We cannot assume 
that it was properly raised." Franklin Financial v. Empire 
Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983) If a party 
fails to present an issue to the trial court, they will have 
"waived the right to raise it" on appeal. Utah County v. 
Brown, 6 7 2 P 2d 83, 85 (Utah 1983). 
In the present case, Pacific Indemnity's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was served by mailing May 2b, 1987, and actually 
receive^ ] by appellant: on May 28, '-8'. (Record at 288-93.) 
Even Local Rule 2.8(b) (under wh;:;: Bonneville el aim- * > have 
been operating), appellant was required to serve counter affida-
vits and any memorandum ' * "* authorities opposing the 
motion within ten days or* X v/ . - .\ Inne 8, .Junn I I.HWH a 
Sunday, IcL See also Rule 3(i), Rules of Practice In the 
Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah. No such 
statement, or counter affidavits were filed by Bonneville. 
Pacific Indemnity's motion was heard on June 8, 1987 and 
appellant appeared at the hearing through counsel. Id. 
Only after Pacific Indemnity's Motion for Summary Judgment 
was granted by the court, did Bonneville react, filing (1) a 
Motion for Rehearing dated June lh UH' ( ,>) a Motion for 
Leave to Amend Answer to the Complaint, dated July 6, 1987; and 
(3) a Motion to Amend Judgment, dated Aug. 20, 19 87. 
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The only argument raised on appeal by Appellant that was 
even mentioned prior to this appeal relates to the attempted 
Amended Answer, alleging contributory negligence. However, the 
Motion to Amend Answer was not even filed until after entry of 
the final judgment, and was properly denied by the court. 
Bonneville does not dispute the propriety of the lower court's 
Order, denying the motion to amend. 
It is obvious that the defenses raised and argued on appeal 
by Bonneville were not presented to the trial court in a manner 
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon because they were not even 
raised until after final judgment was entered. Accordingly, 
the arguments and defenses raised by appellant relating to (1) 
Utah Code Ann. § 3-419(3); (2) Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-406; (3) 
contributory negligence; and (4) collection ratification, along 
with cited cases and authorities cannot be considered by this 
court for the first time on appeal. Appellant did not raise 
any of the above described contentions and defenses in its 
Answer (Record at 17-19), or in its memorandum in opposition to 
Pacific Indemnity's Motion For Summary Judgment, (Record at 
142-46). Indeed, Bonneville acknowledged ultimate liability 
according to the "standard collection process." Iji. at 143. 
The first mention of any defense argued by appellant on appeal 
was raised on either July 6, 1987 or later, which was at least 
12 days after entry of final judgment in this matter. By 
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failing to timely present these arguments and defenses to the 
lower court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon 
Bonneville waived its right to raise them on appeal. Brown, 
672 P.2d at 85. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT BONNEVILLE BANK IS NEVERTHELESS 
ULTIMATELY LIABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW, BASED 
ON EITHER (1) STATUTORY LIABILITY OF THE 
COLLECTING BANK RESULTING FROM WARRANTY OF 
TITLE UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-4-207; OR 
(2) DIRECT COLLECTION RATIFICATION LIABILITY, 
AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER. 
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine 
dispute as to a material fact and if the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Horgan v. Industrial Design 
Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah 1982). See also Celotex Corp. 
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). In the instant case, the 
trial court granted Pacific Indemnity's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, ruling that, 
. . . Bonneville Bank was liable on the checks paid 
over on Brereton's forged endorsements. The plaintiff 
[Pacific Indemnity] alleges [in its supporting 
memorandum] that 3-419(1)(c) does not pertain to 
Bonneville Bank in this instance, since it is not a 
representative of the type to which that section was 
inteded to apply and, in any event Bonneville Bank 
holds all proceeds on the instruments in trust and, 
therefore, it is not entitled to a good faith 
defense. The plaintiff [Pacific indemnity] cited 
Goslin v. Awood, 283 N.W.2d 691, and Cooper v. Union, 
507 P.2d 609. 
* * * 
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The Plaintiff's [Pacific Indemnity's] Motion was 
granted for the reasons set forth in its Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities and supporting Affidavits. 
(Record at 290 and 292.) 
Bonneville is ultimately liable to Pacific Indemnity either 
indirectly as a result of its breach of statutory warranty of 
good title under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-207 (1953 as amended) 
or directly upon a theory of collection ratification. In 
either event, Bonneville is ultimately liable for the converted 
checks paid over forged endorsements as a matter of law. There-
fore, summary judgment is appropriate because Bonneville has 
not properly raised any genuine issue as to a material fact and 
has in fact acknowledged ultimate liability of the "standard 
collection process." (Record at 143.) 
A. Bonneville Bank is Statutorily Liable to Pacific 
Indemnity. 
The "statutory approach" originally relied upon by Pacific 
Indemnity in its pleading and initial motions against Zions and 
First Security Bank follows a simple formula that finds the 
drawee banks (Zions and First Security) strictly liable for 
payment of checks over Brereton's forged endorsements under 
Utah Code Ann. § 7QA-3-419(2) and, in turn, entitles the drawee 
banks to pass the resulting loss or liability "upstream" to the 
depository bank (appellant Bonneville) for breach of statutory 
warranty of good title under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-207. As 
-20-
noted above, the statutory approach effectively passes strict 
loss liability for checks paid over the forged endorsement, 
through the drawee banks, to the collecting bank. 
In Cooper v. Union Bank, 507 P.2d 609 (Cal. 1973), relied 
upon by the lower court in this case, the California Supreme 
Court recognized the statutory approach, holding that a drawee 
bank is "in effect strictly liable to the true owner if it pays 
an instrument on a forged endorsement . . . ." The California 
Court also recognized the traditional "general bank collection 
theory" that "the true owner, in bringing an action against a 
collecting bank for conversion of a check collected on the 
forged endorsement, is deemed to have ratified the collection 
of the proceeds from the payor bank." _Id. at 614. 
Thus, while recognizing the clear statutory rule, the 
Cooper court questioned the necessity of such a route of 
recovery and relied upon a theory of "collection ratification" 
to hold the collecting depository bank directly liable to a 
converted check's owner, without requiring the owner first to 
proceed against the drawee banks. See Cooper, 507 P.2d at 615, 
n.6, and 617. The Court justified the reasonableness of its 
decision, as follows: 
Because liability ultimately rests with the first 
collecting bank, it is unlikely that such a bank was 
intended to have a ready defense in a direct suit by 
the true owner. Requiring cumbersome and uneconomical 
circuity of action to achieve an identical result 
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would obviously run contra the code's explicit under-
lying purposes to simplify, clarify and modernize the 
law governing commercial transactions. 
Id. at 617. 
As discussed below, the end result under the "collection" 
rule likewise justified the lower court's ruling that 
Bonneville, as collecting bank, is ultimately responsible for 
the plaintiff's loss, such liability in fact lies as a matter 
of law, under any alternative theories of recovery. 
B. Bonneville Bank is Liable to Respondent on a 
Direct Collection Theory. 
The collection theory ultimately followed by the Cooper 
court yields a practical rule of absolute liability for 
appellant Bonneville as the collecting bank, though by a path 
somewhat different than that mapped by the statutory language. 
2As stated in that case, "dominant precode law established 
. . . that the proceeds were held, after collection by the 
collecting bank, for the benefit of the true owner. Again 
resorting to general banking theory, we find that the amounts a 
collecting bank remits to a person who transfers to the bank a 
check bearing a forged endorsement do not constitute the 
proceeds of the instrument." Id. at 614. Further, the 
"collecting bank must be deemed to retain the proceeds of the 
instruments . . ., regardless of whether those instruments were 
cashed or accepted for deposit." As similarly observed in 
Ervin v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Company, 3 UCC Rep. 311, 319 
(Pa. 1965), when [the collecting bank] purchased or cashed the 
forged checks drawn on other banks it did so with its own money 
and then, in putting them through for collection it obtained 
from the drawee banks money which belongs to the plaintiff." 
See Cooper, 507 P.2d at 616, n.12. 
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It is apparent from consideration of the Cooper opinion 
that the ratification theory is not a rule intended to absolve 
drawee banks from liability to the true owner of a converted 
instrument under 3-14(1) (c), or otherwise to deprive the owner 
of its rights to recover the conversion laws. The circumstances 
of that case simply furnished the court a vehicle to promote a 
direct right of action by the owner against the depository 
bank, (a right not otherwise clear under the UCC). The court 
thus effectively shifted the conversion laws from the drawees 
to the depository bank in furtherance of the uniformly recog-
nized principal that "irrespective of the sequence of suits or 
settlements, the law should normally come to rest upon the 
first assaulted party [i.e. the first collecting bank] in the 
stream after the one who forged the endorsement. (Emphasis 
added.) White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 581 (2d Ed. 
1979). 
In its Minute Entry ruling on plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment against Zions and First Security, the trial 
court held that the Cooper decision was applicable in this 
jurisdiction, and dismissed plaintiff's action against those 
banks. (Record at 203-05.) If Cooper is to be followed so far 
as to excuse the drawee banks from otherwise clear statutory 
liability upon plaintiffs having named Bonneville Bank as a 
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co-defendant in its Complaint, the reasoning should be followed 
to its conclusion: (1) that any "ratification" of Bonneville's 
collections from Zions and First Security implied by the 
structure of plaintiff's Complaint "does not constitute a 
ratification of appellant Bonneville Bank's delivery of the 
proceeds to the wrong person," [Cooper, 507 P.2d at 614]; (2) 
that Bonneville thus retains the check proceeds collected from 
both Zions and First Security in trust for respondent Pacific 
Indemnity; and (3) that plaintiff has a clear right to recover 
those funds upon judgment against Bonneville to the extent of 
its principal loss, with appropriate pre-payment interest. See 
Aetna Casualty & Trust Co. v. Helper State Bank, 630 P.2d 721, 
728-29 (Utah 1981). This is the ultimate conclusion reached by 
the trial court, and accords, in final result, with the weight 
of authority that collecting banks are and should be directly 
liable to a check's owner, for payment of the check over a 
forged endorsement. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court may properly affirm the decision of the lower 
court for numerous independent reasons. First, Bonneville 
failed to establish appellate jurisdiction with this Court 
because it failed to timely file its Notice of Appeal. Second, 
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this Court should assume the correctness of the judgment below 
because Bonneville failed to cite the Record to support facts 
as required by Rule 24(a)(6), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Third, appellant's attempt to raise contentions and defenses 
for the first time on appeal, without raising such defenses in 
the lower court, should not be considered. Finally, appellant 
Bonneville Bank is clearly liable to respondent Pacific 
Indemnity Company (directly or indirectly) for payment of checks 
over Brereton's forged endorsement, and there was no error in 
the lower court's Summary Judgment. This is true under clear, 
uniformly recognized statutory language and likewise under the 
separate "general theory of bank collection" pronounced by 
California Supreme Court in Cooper v. Union Bank, in turn 
adopted by this court in its earlier rulings in this case. 
Upon these undisputed facts, respondent Pacific Indemnity 
Company respectfully urges this court to affirm the trial 
court's summary judgment against Bonneville Bank as a matter of 
law. In addition, because this appeal not only lacks any 
reasonable or factual basis but also gives rise to fully inde-
pendent and procedural grounds for affirmance, Pacific Indemnity 
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Company respectfully requests that it be awarded appropriate 
attorney's fees and costs.3 
DATED this day of March, 1988. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Larry R. Laycock 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Pacific Indemnity Company 
SCMLRL116 
3Rule 33(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, provides that 
"[i]f the court shall determine that . . . [an] appeal taken 
under these Rules is frivolous . . . it shall award just damages 
and single or double costs, including reasonable attorney's 
fees, to the prevailing party." Under less egregious circum-
stances than those present in this case, the Utah Court of 
Appeals has determined that an award of costs and attorney's 
fees is appropriate under Rule 33. See Barber v. Emporium 
Partnership, 76 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (February 12, 1988). 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFIC INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JERRY G. BRERETON, FIRST 
SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL 
BANK and BONNEVILLE BANK, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Civil No. C82-7259 
Judge Leonard H. Russon 
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• / •/' / v , 
At hearing duly noticed before this Court on April 27, 
1987, this Court considered plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment against defendants First Security Bank and Zions 
Bank, as well as Motions by First Security Bank and Zions 
Bank for partial summary judgment against defendant Bonneville 
Bank. David W. Slaughter appeared on behalf of the plaintiff, 
Gifford W. Price appeared on behalf of Zions First National 
Bank, Craig Carlile appeared on behalf of First Security Bank, 
and Douglas A. Baxter appeared on behalf of Bonneville Bank. 
At hearing, the Court also considered Motions made by First 
Security Bank and Zions Bank to dismiss plaintiff's claims 
A-l 
—.* , •*"* ,• ^ ft 
against them. 
On June 8, 1987, the matter came up once again for hear-
ing on plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment against 
Bonneville Bank. The above-identified counsel also appeared 
at that hearing on behalf of their respective clients. 
The Court now having heard all arguments of counsel and 
having reviewed the memoranda on file and good cause otherwise 
appearing, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That plaintiff be and hereby is granted summary 
judgment against Bonneville Bank in the amount of $26,038.07, 
plus interest thereon at the legal rate of ten percent (10%) 
per annum pre-judgment and twelve percent (12%) per annum from 
the date hereof until paid; and, 
2. That plaintiff's actions against Zions First National 
Bank and First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. be and hereby are 
dismissed without prejudice; and, 
3. First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. and Zions First 
National Bank be and hereby are granted summary judgment against 
Bonneville Bank for breach of actual and implied warranties 
of presentment except that claims by these banks for attorney's 
fees against Bonneville Hank are denied. 
DATED this /--') day of June, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
a«*k XE0D5ARD H. RUSSON/ D i s t r i c t CoLx\ 
D -N -W ~C / , ---Judge \ 
0«py(V Clerk , 2 -
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Cynthia Northstrom, being first duly sworn, states: That 
she is employed by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau, attorneys for plaintiff herein; that she mailed a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment and Order (pro-
posed) postage prepaid, first class mail, on the Q^C day of 
June, 1987, to: 
Craig Carlile, Esq. 
Hay, Quinney & Nebeker 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Gifford W. Price, Esq. 
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Allen K. Young, Esq, 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to 
iPttUt* ^M^2^u 
t h i a Norttfistrom 
'ore me t h i s ^ r / ) day of May, 
1987 
My Commission Expires: 
JL1>'<^ Jl& / V 
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//NOTARY PUBLIC S7 
Residing in Salt Lake City, Utah 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFIC INDEMNITY COMPANY, : ORDER 
a California corporation, I 
: CIVIL NO. C-82-7259 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JERRY G. BRERETON, et al., 
Defendants. 
On June 24, 1987 this Court entered an Amended Judgment and 
Order wherein it granted the plaintiff Summary Judgment against 
Bonneville Bank, granted Zions First National Bank and First 
Security Bank Orders of Dismissal without Prejudice as to 
plaintiff's Complaint against them, granted Zions and First 
Security Bank's Summary Judgment against Bonneville Bank for 
breach of warranty of presentment, breach of guarantee of 
endorsement, and breach of contract, and denied all parties 
claims for attorney's fees. This Amended Judgment and Order 
pertained to those motions which were heard on June 7, 1987. 
Bonneville Bank moved for an order granting it a new hearing 
in this matter on the grounds that its attorneys were unaware of 
the Local Rules for Third District Court, thought they had 
additional time in which to obtain affidavits, and alleging that 
the case had been pending for several years, that an agreement 
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had been reached by all parties for the plaintiff to pursue only 
defendant Brereton and, therefore, no discovery was undertaken 
for those years, and that if Bonneville Bank had time, it could 
have procured affidavits establishing questions of fact requiring 
a trial. 
Later, on July 6, 1987, Bonneville Bank moved to amend its 
Answer to the Complaint to allege contributory negligence. 
A review of this matter is in order. 
The Complaint was filed on September 8, 1982, wherein 
plaintiff sued Brereton for fraud, Zions First National Bank for 
conversion, First Security Bank for conversion, and Bonneville 
Bank for "knowingly or negligently converting or aiding in the 
conversion of property belonging to Triad Systems Corporation." 
On October 15, 1982 Bonneville Bank answered, denying 
charging allegations, and alleging the affirmative defenses of 
estoppel and waiver wherein Triad gave Brereton direct or implied 
authority to negotiate checks written to Triad Corporation. It 
did not plead contributory negligence or any other matters as 
affirmative defenses. 
On October 18, 1982 Zions Bank answered the Complaint, and 
crossclaimed against Bonneville Bank. Zions denied allegations 
and alleged the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence, 
estoppel, waiver or release, ratification, insufficient notice, 
laches, 405 and 406 defenses, and lack of capacity or standing to 
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sue. The Crossclaim against Bonneville alleged breach of 
warranty, and/or breach of indemnity, and/or contributory 
negligence. 
On November 4, 1982 Bonneville Bank replied to Zions1 
Crossclaim denying charging allegations, but alleging no 
affirmative defenses. 
On December 13, 1982 a Default Judgment was taken against 
defendant Brereton. 
On July 16, 1986 First Security Bank answered the Complaint, 
and crossclaimed against Bonneville. The bank denied charging 
allegations in the Complaint, alleged the affirmative defenses of 
estoppel, authorization or ratification by Triad, 419(3) defenses 
of good faith consistent with reasonable commercial standards, 
laches, statute of limitations, insufficient claim time, and 
alleging plaintiff had actually received payment. The Crossclaim 
against Bonneville alleged similar allegations to those alleged 
by Zions Bank. 
On December 26, 1986 First Security Bank filed a Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment against Bonneville, and filed an 
affidavit of Joe DeNiro in support thereof. First Security 
alleged that Bonneville was the prior endorser, and thus liable 
to First Security for breach of warranty of good title and 
guarantee of prior endorsement. It alleged each check was 
endorsed by Brereton and presented to Bonneville for deposit in 
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an account opened by Brereton entitled "Triad Systems," that 
Bonneville endorsed each check following Brereton1s endorsement, 
that Bonneville endorsed each check "prior endorsement 
guaranteed," that Bonneville presented the check to First 
Security for payment, which was paid by First Security. 
First Security argued that both endorsements warranted that 
they had good title to each check, that Brereton's fraudulent 
endorsement constituted failure of good title in both Brereton 
and Bonneville Bank, and thus each breached warranty. They also 
argued that Bonneville Bank breached its guarantee of validity of 
all prior endorsements. 
On February 18, 1987 attorney for Bonneville Bank 
acknowledged liability of Bonneville to First Security Bank, and 
indicated a willingness to indemnify First Security, which First 
Security rejected because it made claim to attorney's fees. 
On the same date, Bonneville filed its Memorandum in 
Opposition to First Security1s Motion for Summary Judgment, 
offering to sign indemnification agreement with said bank. 
On April 9, 1987, the affidavit of defendant Brereton was 
filed, wherein he admitted the fraudulent scheme, and stated that 
Triad Corporation had no knowledge that he had paid towards the 
Judgment, and that a balance was existing of $26,038.07. 
On the same date plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment against First Security Bank and Zions Bank, arguing that 
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the said banks were strictly liable to the plaintiff in light of 
Section 70A-3-419(1)(c) which provides that: "An instrument is 
converted when it is paid on a forged endorsement." 
On April 14, 1987 Zions Bank filed a Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment against Bonneville, with a supporting Affidavit 
of Donald Rocha, which indicated that the checks in question were 
processed on the basis of prior endorsement guarantees by 
Bonneville Bank. 
On April 23, 1987 Zions filed a Motion to Dismiss 
plaintiff's Complaint. 
On the same date, Zions Bank filed a Motion in Opposition to 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that plaintiff's 
recovery should be only against Bonneville Bank as the depository 
or collecting bank which had begun the processing, and that 
plaintiff's action against Zions was not well-founded. The 
foregoing was based upon the argument that by plaintiffs suing 
both Zions Bank (drawee or payor bank) and Bonneville Bank 
(depository or collecting bank), the plaintiff had ratified the 
payment of proceeds by Zions to Bonneville Bank. Therefore, 
there was no cause of action for conversion against Zions Bank. 
The plaintiff did not sue Zions Bank for negligence. The only 
theory against Zions Bank was on conversion. Zions relied upon 
Cooper v. Union Bank, 507 P.2d 609 (Cal. 1973). 
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On May 1, 1987 this Court in a handwritten Memorandum 
Decision denied the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
against Zions and First Security, indicating that the Cooper case 
was applicable, and granted the Motions of First Security Bank 
and Zions Bank on their Crossclaims, except as to attorney's 
fees. 
On May 26, 1987 plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment against Bonneville Bank based upon the affidavits filed 
by Jerry Brereton, Joe DeKiro and Donald Rocha. In support 
thereof, plaintiff argued that following the Cooper case, if the 
payor banks (here, Zions and First Security) were free of 
liability because of ratification, then any ratification of 
Bonneville's collections from payor banks did not constitute a 
ratification of Bonneville's delivery to the wrong person, that 
Bonneville retained the check proceeds collected from the payor 
banks in trust for the plaintiff, and plaintiff had a right to 
Judgments on those funds. 
A Notice of Hearing of Summary Judgment was filed with the 
Court on the same date, May 26, 1987, noticing the matter for 
June 8, 1987 at 10:00 a.m. 
On June 8, 1987, the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
against Bonneville Bank was heard. Attorney Doug Baxter appeared 
for Bonneville Bank. The other parties were represented. The 
Court granted plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, and again 
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indicated that the Motions of the payor banks to dismiss were 
granted without prejudice. The claims for attorney's fees were 
denied. 
On June 16, 1987 the Court signed and entered the written 
Judgment and Order granting plaintiff's Summary Judgment against 
Bonneville in the amount of $26,038.07, and dismissing 
plaintiff's claims without prejudice against Zions and First 
Security, and granting the Motions of First Security and Zions 
for Summary Judgment against Bonneville, which actually became 
moot, inasmuch as they were dismissed from the lawsuit. 
On the same date, June 16, 1987, Bonneville Bank filed a 
Motion for a New Hearing, alleging that they had received the 
Summary Judgment on May 29, 1987, that Bonneville's counsel were 
unaware of the Third District's Local Rules, and thought Rule 2.8 
applied, allowing them ten days in which to respond to the said 
motion, that they had made a mistake, and had not had time to 
prepare for the hearing with opposing affidavits, that there were 
material issues of fact that could be raised by affidavits as to 
a 3-419 defense of acting in good faith within commercially 
reasonable standards in cashing the checks of Brereton. This 
motion was supported by an Affidavit of Roger Bjornson, wherein 
he indicated the bank had no knowledge, and that they had acted 
reasonably. 
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On June 26, 1987 the plaintiff filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Bonneville Bank's Motion for New Hearing, taking 
the position that mistake as to Rule 2-8 did not justify a new 
hearing and that the Court could not grant a new trial per Rule 
59, since no specific grounds were stated as required by that 
rule, that there should be no allowance for simply "mistaken 
assumptions," and, that in any case, there was no prejudice since 
the Bjornson affidavit was not sufficient in law as required by 
Rule 56, and even if it was, it was irrelevant since Bonneville 
Bank was liable on the checks paid over on Breretonfs forged 
endorsements. The plaintiff alleges that 3-419(1)(c) does not 
pertain to Bonneville Bank in this instance, since it is not a 
representative of the type to which that section was intended to 
apply and, in any event, Bonneville Bank holds all proceeds on 
the instruments in trust and, therefore, it is not entitled to a 
good faith defense. The plaintiff cited Goslin v. Cawood, 283 
N.W.2d 691, and Cooper v. Union, 507 P.2d 609. 
On July 6, 1987 Bonneville Bank filed its Reply to the 
plaintiff's Memorandum, pointing out that the Complaint had been 
filed in 1982, that an agreement by all the parties was that 
plaintiff would pursue Brereton, that none of the parties 
undertook discovery during that interim period, that the Motion 
for Summary Judgment was filed on May 26, 1987, and not received 
by the bank until May 29, that the attorneys were unaware of the 
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Third District Rule and were unprepared at the hearing, and that 
under the Rules of Procedure should be granted a rehearing. 
On July 6, 1987 Bonneville Bank filed a Motion to Amend its 
Answer to plead contributory negligence against the plaintiff. 
Defendant Bonneville Bank argues that it thought Rule 2.8 of 
the Uniform Rules of Practice in District Courts was applicable 
and, therefore, was not prepared at the time of hearing on 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. However, even allowing 
plaintiff application of Rule 2.8, instead of the Third District 
Local Rules, defendant did not comply with such rule. Rule 2.8 
requires a responding party in a Motion for Summary Judgment to 
"file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of 
the motion, a statement of answering points and authorities and 
counter affidavits.M Rule 2.8, Rules of Practice in the District 
Courts of the State of Utah. The said rule further provides that 
"decisions shall be rendered without a hearing, unless requested 
by the court, in which event the clerk shall set a date and time 
for such hearing." | 
The plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was served by 
mailing on May 26, 1987, and actually received by the defendant 
on May 28, 1987. Under Rule 2.8 the said defendant was required 
to serve counter affidavits and a statement of answering points 
and authorities within ten days of May 28, or by June 7 (actually 
June 8, June 6 being a Sunday). No such statement, nor 
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countering affidavits were filed. Therefore, there was nothing 
for the plaintiff to reply to. 
The matter was heard on June 8, 1987, and the said defendant 
appeared through counsel. 
It was only after the hearing on the said Motion for Summary 
Judgment which was granted by the Court that plaintiff filed for 
a new hearing, filed an affidavit, and filed a Motion for Leave 
to Amend its Answer to the Complaint to plead the affirmative 
defense of contributory negligence. 
This matter has been pending since 1982, there have been 
several hearings prior to plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
attended by all parties, various pleadings indicate clearly 
issues as to negligence, the said defendant was put on timely 
notice, and received a copy of plaintiff's Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities. 
There is no such motion as a motion for "reconsideration11 or 
"rehearing." Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 657 P. 2d 1346 
(Utah 1983); Peav v. Peav, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980). 
Bonneville Bank's Motion for a New Hearing is denied. The 
plaintiff's Motion was granted for the reasons set forth in its 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities and supporting affidavits. 
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Plaintiff's counsel will prepare the Order denying 
Bonneville's Motion for Rehearing. 
Dated this day of August, 1987. 
LEONARD H. RUSSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
*-•/ 
I I f t ' T 
H DIXON MEDLEY 
Ciert. 
Civ J'v C'err. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order, postage prepaid, to the following, this 7 
day of August, 1987: 
David W. Slaughter 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Clifford W. Price 
Attorney for Defendant Zions 
800 Kennecott Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Anthony W. Schofield 
Craig Carlile 
Attorneys for Defendant First Security 
92 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Allen K. Young 
Attorney for Defendant Bonneville 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
c rox 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFIC INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
a California corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JERRY G. BRERETON, et al., 
Defendants. 
RULING 
CIVIL NO. C-82-7259 
Defendant Bonneville Bank has filed a Motion for Amendment 
of Judgment and Objection to Order. A Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities has been filed in support thereof. Plaintiff has 
filed a Memorandum in Objection. The matter has been submitted 
to the Court for ruling without a hearing pursuant to Rule 3. 
This Court granted plaintifffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
on June 8, 1987. Defendant received a copy of plaintiff's 
proposed Order and Judgment on June 10, 1987. The defendant then 
received an Amended proposed Judgment and Order on June 12, 1987. 
This Court signed and entered the initial Judgment on June 16, 
1987, and the Amended Judgment on June 24, 1987. 
On June 16, 1987 defendant Bank filed a Motion for Rehearing 
with a Memorandum in support thereof, and also an Objection to 
the proposed Order. (It is assumed that the Objection was 
actually received by the clerk's office, but apparently misplaced 
and actually dated filed on July 1, 1986.) No Objection to the 
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proposed Amended Order was ever filed. The Court signed the 
Amended Order and entered the same on June 24, 1987. 
On July 26, 1987 plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition 
to defendant's Motion for a Rehearing. 
On July 6, 1987 defendant filed a Reply to plaintiff's 
Memorandum. The Reply was dated June 30, 1987. This Reply made 
no mention of objections to either the initial proposed Judgment, 
or the proposed Amended Judgment. 
On July 16, 1987, defendant noticed up its Motion for New 
Hearing and Objections to the Proposed Judgment and Order. A 
hearing on July 27, 1987 resulted in denial of the same. The 
Court entered its Order denying the said Motion on August 7, 
1987. 
As this Court ruled earlier, there is no such motion as a 
Motion for New Hearing or Rehearing. The Amended Judgment was 
entered on June 24, 1987, twelve days after defendant received a 
copy of the proposed Amended Judgment. The effective date of the 
Amended Judgment herein is June 24, 1987. Orders on plaintifffs 
subsequent Motions bear their own effective dates. Plaintiff's 
Motion to Amend the Judgment is denied. 
Dated this / / day of September, 1987. 
^ ^ ID H. RUSSON^ 
DISTRICT COUIJST3TBG2'- * 
a DIXON H a ^ 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Ruling, postage prepaid, to the following, this, 
day of September, 1987: 
A. Dennis Norton 
David W. Slaughter 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Anthony W. Schofield 
Craig Carlile 
Attorneys for Defendant First Security 
400 Deseret Bldg. 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Gifford W. Price 
Attorney for Defendant Zions 
800 Kennecott Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Allen K. Young 
Attorney for Defendant Bonneville Bank 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
c*? X z9s6<ynM<^ 
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DAVID W. SLAUGHTER (A2977) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFIC INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
ORDER 
vs . 
JERRY G. BRERETON, FIRST 
SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, ]SL A. , 
ZIONK FIRST NATIONAL BANK and 
BONNEVILLE BANK, 
Defendants. 
Defendant Bonneville Bank's Motion for Rehearing and 
separate Motion for Leave To Amend Its Complaint in the 
entitled action came on regularly for hearing before the 
entitled court on Monday, July 27, 1987, the Honorable 
Leonard H. Russon, presiding. Defendant, Bonneville Bank 
appeared through its counsel, Allen K. Young; Plaintiff 
Pacific Indemnity Company appeared through its counsel, 
David W. Slaughter. 
C-l 
Civil No. -€^?-^25-9— 
Judge Leonard H. Russon 
The Court has heard and considered all argument of 
both parties, and has separately reviewed and considered the 
Memoranda offered by the parties in support of their respective 
positions. 
The Court thus being fully advised in the premises 
and for good cause appearing, and upon its own decision and 
Order dated August 7, 1987, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Bonneville Bank's 
Motion for Rehearing on the Summary Judgment entered against 
it on June 16, 1987, in favor of Plaintiff, be and hereby is 
denied; 
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED, that 
Defendant Bonneville Bank's Motion to Amend its Answer be 
and hereby is denied. 
DATED this day of August, 19 87. 
BY THE COURT 
ft «y - - . * ^ . N ^ 
H. 1>.A«J«<V H U V C L E : Y ! •, 
By >-\v ^rV >i cfM.-LAuLs'' Leonard H. Russon 
~ ~ 'TiJ^c'jr"~ Third District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order was mailed, postage prepaid, with the U.S. 
Postal Service, to the following this // day of August, 1987: 
C-2-
Allen K. Young 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
and to 
Craig Carlisle 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
92 North University Avenue 
#210 
Provo, Utah 84 601 
and to 
Gifford W. Price 
Callister, Nebeker & Duncan 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Case No. C83-7259 
'AIMLL 
v / / 
^ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFIC INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
a California corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JERRY G. BRERETON, et al., 
Defendants. 
RULING 
CIVIL NO. C-82-7259 
Defendant Bonneville Bank has filed a Motion for Amendment 
of Judgment and Objection to Order. A Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities has been filed in support thereof. Plaintiff has 
filed a Memorandum in Objection. The matter has been submitted 
to the Court for ruling without a hearing pursuant to Rule 3. 
This Court granted plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
on June 8, 19S7. Defendant received a copy of plaintiff's 
proposed Order and Judgment on June 10, 1987. The defendant then 
received an Amended proposed Judgment and Order on June 12, 1987. 
This Court signed and entered the initial Judgment on June 16, 
1987, and the Amended Judgment on June 24, 1987. 
On June 16, 1987 defendant Bank filed a Motion for Rehearing 
with a Memorandum in support thereof, and also an Objection to 
the proposed Order. (It is assumed that the Objection was 
actually received by the clerk's office, but apparently misplaced 
and actually dated filed on July 1, 1986.) No Objection to the 
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proposed Amended Order was ever filed. The Court signed the 
Amended Order and entered the same on June 24, 1987. 
On July 26, 1987 plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition 
to defendant's Motion for a Rehearing. 
On July 6, 1987 defendant filed a Reply to plaintiff's 
Memorandum, The Reply was dated June 30, 1987. This Reply made 
no mention of objections to either the initial proposed Judgment, 
or the proposed Amended Judgment. 
On July 16, 1987, defendant noticed up its Motion for New 
Hearing and Objections to the Proposed Judgment and Order. A 
hearing on July 27, 1987 resulted in denial of the same. The 
Court entered its Order denying the said Motion on August 7, 
1987. 
As this Court ruled earlier, there is no such motion as a 
Motion for New Hearing or Rehearing. The Amended Judgment was 
entered on June 24, 1987, twelve days after defendant received a 
copy of the proposed Amended Judgment. The effective date of the 
Amended Judgment herein is June 24, 1987. Orders on plaintiff's 
subsequent Motions bear their own effective dates. Plaintiff's 
Motion to Amend the Judgrpent^s denied. 
Dated this / / day of September, 1987. 
D H. RUSSON 
DISTRICT COUI^TJlJUGE * _ 
D-2 °^ 
By m^ 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Ruling, postage prepaid, to the following, this, 
day of September, 1987: 
A. Dennis Norton 
David W. Slaughter 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Anthony W. Schofield 
Craig Carlile 
Attorneys for Defendant First Security 
400 Deseret Bldg. 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Gifford W. Price 
Attorney for Defendant Zions 
800 Kennecott Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Allen K. Young 
Attorney for Defendant Bonneville Bank 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
c*? ^ eQ>U/nd&t>L*j> 
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ALLEN K. YOUNG (A3583) 
YOUNG & KESTER 
Anomevs for Defendant J. F. Ollivier 
101 East 200 South 
Sprimmlle, Utah 84663 
Telephone: 489-3294 
J IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
^ n u - 1 STATE OF UTAH 
•0' —oooOooo--
/ 
PACIFIC INDEMNITY CO., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JERRY G. BRERETON, et. al., 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. C82-7259 
Judse Leonard H. Russon 
-oooOooo--
TO THE PLAINTIFF AND ITS ATTORNEY, DAVID W. SLAUGHTER: 
Notice is hereby given that defendant Bonneville Bank hereby appeals to the Coun 
of Appeals for the State of Utah from the summary judgmerit entered in this action by the 
District Coun lor the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on 
the 24th day of June, 1987, and from the subsequent denial of defendant's request for a 
new hearing and objections to the proposed order entered on August 19,1987. 
c4 DATED this 3 day of September, 1987. 
ALLEN K^Y( 
Attorney for Defendant J. F. Ollivier 
E - l 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, this 
SI day of September, 1987, to the following: 
David W. Slaughter, Esq. 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Craig Carlile, Esq. 
Ray, Quinney &. Nebeker 
400Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Gifford W. Price, Esq. 
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake Citv, UT 84133 
%\s^xi^^\ dK&i-*~c\ 
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CERITIFCATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that on the 18th day of 
March, 1988, I caused four (4) true and correct copies 
of the Brief of Respondent Pacific Indemnity Company 
to be served upon the following: 
Allen K. Young 
Attorney for Defendant Bonneville Bank 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
